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COMMENTS
RELIEF FOR THE CIVILLY COMMITTED: A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TREATMENT
The fact that a person has a mental ailment is not a crime.
Therefore, if any one is. . .restrained of his liberty because
of a mental ailment the state owes a duty to provide for him
reasonable medical attention. If medical attention reasonably well adapted to his needs is not given, the victim is not
a patient but is virtually a prisoner.'
With these words the editors of the American BarAssociation Journal hailed, in 1960, what they saw as the genesis of a
new right-the right of the involuntarily civilly committed
mental patient to receive reasonably adequate treatment for
his mental impairment. The impetus for this editorial was an
article appearing in the same issue of the American Bar Association Journal, which proposed, for the first time, that the
courts recognize and enforce a "right to treatment" based upon
"our present concept of due process of law. ' 2 From this rather
auspicious beginning, a constitutionally based right to treatment has evolved, albeit rather slowly, to the point where it has
now been accorded widespread judicial affirmation.'
This comment will first outline the development of the
constitutional right to treatment concept. Subsequent sections
will examine the theories upon which this right has been
founded. Finally, some of the arguments against recognition of
a constitutional right to treatment will be presented and critically evaluated.
I Editorial, A New Right, 46 A.B.A.J. 516, 517 (1960).
2 Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
3 See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.), cert. granted,95 S. Ct. 171

(1974); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D.Minn. 1974); Stachulak v. Couglin, 364
F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill.
1973); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, on submission of proposed standards by
defendants, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), appeal docketed sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, No. 72-2634, 5th Cir., Aug.
1, 1972. Contra, New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357
F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp.
1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-3110, 5th Cir., Oct. 4, 1972.
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT

The earliest cases recognizing the right of the involuntarily
civilly committed to treatment based this right upon statutory grounds. The first and most significant of these cases
was Rouse v. Cameron,5 in which the District of Columbia

Circuit Court of Appeals considered the issue of "whether a
person involuntarily committed to a mental hospital on being
acquited of an offense by reason of insanity has a right to
treatment .

.

. ..6 Chief Judge Bazelon held that "Con-

gress established a statutory 'right to treatment' in the 1964
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act"7 which was cognizable in habeas corpus. As a result, the case was remanded
to the district court for a factual determination of whether
adequate treatment was being provided.' In the wake of this
I A comprehensive discussion of the civil commitment process is beyond the scope
of this comment. However, it is important to recognize the distinction between voluntary and involunatry commitment. A person is voluntarily committed to a mental
institution as the result of his own application, or of his acquiescence in an application
made on his behalf by another, for admission to the institution. In general, voluntary
commitment reflects a desire, or at least some degree of willingness, on the part of the
person committed to be a patient in the institution.
A person is involuntarily committed when he is confined to a mental institution,
on the basis of his "dangerousness" or his "need" for care and treatment, as the result
of initiation of civil commitment proceedings againstthe person committed. Although
a commitment may have originally been voluntary, it may become involuntary if the
patient's request for release from the institution is denied by a requisite number of the
institution's staff members in accordance with a specified procedure, again on the basis
of "dangerousness" or "need" for further care and treatment.
For further discussion of the distinction between voluntary and involuntary commitment and of the civil commitment process in general, see AMEmcAN BAR FoUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 15-115 (rev. ed. 1971); 1 PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE-THE MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY
HANDIcAPPED 101-271 (B. Ennis and P. Friedman eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL
RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED]; Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Theories and Procedures, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1288 (1966); Note, Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill in Kentucky, 62 Ky. L.J. 769 (1974).
373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Id. at 452.
7 Id. at 453. This act provides that "[a] person hospitalized in a public hospital
for mental illness shall, during his hospitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and treatment. . . ." D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (Supp. V, 1966).
8 After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Mr. Rouse, the
petitioner, was receiving adequate treatment. This finding was never subjected to
appellate review, however, because Mr. Rouse was released due to defects in his initial
commitment. 387 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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landmark decision, courts have found a statutory right to treatment in civil commitment statutes relating not only to the
mentally ill, 9 but also to sexual psychopaths ' and chronic
alcoholics." In addition, statutory bases have been utilized to
extend this right to incarcerated drug addicts,'" juvenile
delinquents,' 3 and defective delinquents.14
Although Rouse and its progeny based the right to treatment on statutory provisions, it should be noted that the opinions in several of these cases also suggest that the right could
possibly rest on constitutional grounds.' 5 In the Rouse opinion,
for example, Chief Judge Bazelon wrote:
Absence of treatment "might draw into question the constitutionality of [this] mandatory commitment section as
applied." . . . Had appellant been found criminally responsible, he could have been confined a year at most, however
dangerous he might have been. He has been confined four
years and the end is not in sight. Since this difference rests
only on need for treatment, a failure to supply treatment may
raise a question of due process of law. It has also been suggested that a failure to supply treatment may violate the
equal protection clause. Indefinite commitment without
treatment of one who has been found not criminally responsible may be so inhumane as to be "cruel and unusual
punishment."
Such dictum in these earlier cases notwithstanding, it was
not until 1972 that a constitutionally based right to treatment
was recognized. In that year a federal district court in Alabama
' E.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Maatallah v. Warden,
470 P.2d 122 (Nev. 1970).
1,Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F.
Supp. 1320 (M.D. Ala. 1973); People ex rel. Ceschini v. Warden, 291 N.Y.S.2d 200
(App. Div. 1968).
" Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
22 People ex rel. Blunt v. Narcotic Addiction Control Comm'n, 295 N.Y.S.2d 276
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 296 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 1968).
11In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); In re Tsesmilles, 265 N.E.2d 308 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970).
" Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Crim. Ct., 407 U.S. 355 (1972).
1' Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Nason v. Superintendent, 233
N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1968); Maatallah v. Warden, 470 P.2d 122 (Nev. 1970).
", 373 F.2d at 453 (footnotes omitted).
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expressly held, in Wyatt v. Stickney, 1 that involuntarily civilly
committed mental patients have a constitutional right to treatment. The court relied upon a dual due process theory 8 in
concluding that the involuntarily civilly committed ". . . unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition."' 19
Despite the obvious significance of the Wyatt decision's
affirmation of a constitutional right to treatment, that decision
has not served to foreclose continued controversy over this
issue. In fact, both Wyatt and the concept of a constitutionally
based right to treatment were challenged almost immediately
by a decision in another federal district court. Burnham v.
Department of Public Health" presented the same basic issue
as the Wyatt case, but produced a radically different result. In
Burnham the court recognized that persons committed to
325 F. Supp. 781, on submission of proposed standards by defendants, 334 F.
Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), appeal
docketed sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, No. 72-2634, 5th Cir., Aug. 1, 1972.
," See text accompanying notes 40-58 infra for discussion and analysis of this dual
due process theory.
'" 325 F. Supp. at 784. Wyatt is noteworthy for several reasons in addition to its
recognition of a constitutional right to treatment. First, unlike the right to treatment
cases which preceded it, Wyatt is a class action rather than an action by an individual
seeking habeas corpus relief. This distinction and the deplorable conditions prevailing
in Alabama's mental institutions led the court to conclude that the entire Alabama
system of mental institutions was failing to provide adequate treatment for the class
of persons involuntarily committed.
Second, Wyatt is the first case in which a court has established, and required
compliance with, minimum standards for the operation of mental institutions and the
treatment programs of patients.
Third, Wyatt extends the right to treatment to the mentally retarded. The court
recognized that in the area of the right to treatment ".

.

. no viable distinction can

be made between the mentally ill and the mentally retarded." Thus, it held that the
same due process theories were applicable to both classes of patients, stating that
"[pleople involuntarily committed through noncriminal procedures to institutions for
the mentally retarded have a constitutional right to receive such individual habilitation as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to lead a more useful and meaningful life and to return to society." 344 F. Supp. at 390. Another recent decision has also
held ".

.

. that due process requires civil commitment for reasons of mental retarda-

tion be accompanied by minimally adequate treatment.. . ... Welsch v. Likins, 373
F. Supp. 487, 499 (D. Minn. 1974). See also Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally
Retarded: Some CriticalIssues, 48 NorE DAME LAw. 133 (1972).
" 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-3110, 5th Cir., Oct.
4, 1972.
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Georgia's mental institutions may have a moral right to effective treatment, but refused to declare that the state was under
a legal obligation to provide such treatment. Judge Smith
found the "adequacy of the diagnosis, care, and treatment"
afforded patients in the state institutions to be a matter
governed by state law. In addition, the court found "no legal
precedent" for according the asserted right to treatment constitutional status. 1 The opinion noted Wyatt but declared: "This
Court respectfully disagrees with the conclusion reached by
that court in finding an affirmative federal right to treatment
absent a statute so requiring. ' 22 Finally, Judge Smith remarked that even if there were a constitutional right to treatment, it would be nonjusticiable due to a lack of "specific,
213
judicially ascertainable and manageable standards.
Although the appeals of Wyatt and Burnham are still
pending in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,24 it appears that
the Fifth Circuit has resolved the conflict between these two
diametrically opposed decisions in a separate case, Donaldson'
2
v. O'Connor,'
decided April 26, 1974. Kenneth Donaldson had
been civilly committed in 1957 to a state mental hospital in
'2
Florida after being diagnosed as a "paranoid schizophrenic.
He remained confined for more than 14 years, during which
time he received "little or no psychiatric care or treatment."
Following his release, Mr. Donaldson brought an action in federal district court under the Civil Rights Act,2 1 contending that
he possessed a constitutional right to receive treatment or to
be released and seeking damages against certain hospital offi21 Id. at 1339.

2 Id. at 1340.
2 Id. at 1341.
24These two cases were consolidated on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit and were argued in December of 1972. As noted in the text, these appeals
are still pending.
- 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 171 (1974).
" 493 F.2d at 509.
'Id.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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cials who, he alleged, had deprived him of this right. He
charged that these officials had "acted in bad faith.

. .

and

with intentional, malicious, and reckless disregard of his constitutional rights." 9 After being instructed that the plaintiff
was indeed possessed of a constitutional right to treatment, a
jury found that Mr. Donaldson had been denied this right and
awarded him $28,500 in compensatory damages and $10,000 in
punitive damages. 0
The defendants appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals contending that the district court had erroneously instructed the jury. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the jury's verdict,
holding that the instructions were proper and ".

.

. that a

person involuntarily civilly committed to a state mental hospital has a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or
to improve his mental condition."3 This holding was based
upon a "two-part theory" 32 of due process similar to that uti493 F.2d at 513. If, as the facts of the Donaldson case indicate, there was illwill between Mr. Donaldson and hospital officials, it may have resulted from the
former's litigiousness in seeking to obtain his release from the hospital. Dr. Morton
Birnbaum has observed:
Acting as his own attorney, Donaldson petitioned the Florida courts for a
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds of inadquate care and treatment. His
petition was denied. Thereafter, he continued to present his claims to the
Florida courts, federal courts, and the United States Supreme Court. Four
times the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari, from 1960 to 1970 ....
As a result of various courts' reluctance to even hear the case, Donaldson
remained in Florida State Hospital for almost fifteen years before he was
finally released.
Debate: The Right to Treatment-Encounterand Synthesis, 10 DUQUEsNE L. Rnv. 554,
554-55 (1972).
It was noted that as a result of these four decisions, the Court refused to consider
the issue of a constitutional right to treatment. Id. at 555 n.4. The four decisions
referred to are Donaldson v. O'Connor, 400 U.S. 869 (1970); Donaldson v. O'Connor,
390 U.S. 971 (1968); Donaldson v. Florida, 371 U.S. 806 (1962); In re Donaldson, 364
U.S. 808 (1960). On three other ocdasions the Supreme Court has likewise refused to
consider this issue. New York ex rel. Anonymous v. La Burt, 385 U.S. 936 (1966);
Stephens v. La Burt, 373 U.S. 928 (1963); New York ex rel. Anonymous v. La Burt,
369 U.S. 428 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
1 It should be noted that Donaldsonrepresents the third type of cause of action
which can be utilized to secure the right to treatment. Whereas Rouse was an action
by an individual seeking habeas corpus relief and Wyatt is a class action seeking
injunctive relief, in Donaldson the plaintiff sought and was awarded monetary damages for the deprivation of his constitutional right to treatment.
3, 493 F.2d at 520.
n Id.
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lized in Wyatt. The opinion also cites Wyatt with approval, 33
while criticizing, at least impliedly, the rationale of the
Burnham decision.3 4 Thus, it would seem that in Donaldsonthe
Fifth Circuit has clearly foreshadowed the ultimate outcome of
the Wyatt and Burnham appeals, thereby effectively undermining the Burnham decision, which had theretofore been the
leading case to reject the theory of a constitutional right to
treatment. More importantly, however, the Donaldsondecision
represents the most significant precedent to date in "a growing
' 35
body of law recognizing a constitutional right to treatment.
II.

THEORETICAL BASES OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO TREATMENT

In Rouse v. Cameron36 Chief Judge Bazelon suggested that
a constitutional right to treatment might be based upon three
provisions of the Constitution: the due process clause, the
equal protection clause, and the cruel and unusual punishment
clause. His insight has proven accurate; theories based upon
these provisions (individually and in various combinations)
have been developed and refined by both courts" and commentators."
Id. at 521, 522 n.22, 526.
Id. at 525-26.
31 Welsch v. Lildns, 373 F. Supp. 487, 497 (D. Minn. 1974).
- 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
31Id. at 453. See quotation in text accompanying note 16 supra.
3 See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 171
(1974); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Stachulak v. Coughlin,
1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, on submission
364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill.
of proposed standards by defendants, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced,
344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), appeal docketed sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt,
No. 72-2634, 5th Cir., Aug. 1, 1972.
3,For a presentation and discussion of the due process theories see Brief for Amici
Curiae at 48-54, Wyatt v. Aderholt, No. 72-2634, 5th Cir., appeal docketed, Aug. 1,

1972;

LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED,

supra note 4, at 281; Reisner,

Psychiatric Hospitalization and the Constitution: Some Observations on Emerging
Trends, 1973 ILL. L.F. 9 (1973) (See pages 10-13 of this article for a discussion of the
"least restrictive alternative" aspect of a due process right to treatment.); Comment,
Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly Committed Mental Patients to Adequate
Treatment, 86 HANv. L. REV. 1282, 1285-91 (1973); Note, The Nascent Right to
Treatment, 53 VA. L. Rnv. 1134 (1967); Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the
Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87, 102-03 (1967).
For a presentation and discussion of the equal protection theory see Brief for Amici
Curiae supra, at 61-67; LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPE, supra note 4, at
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Due Process

The Donaldsonand Wyatt decisions utilized an essentially
two-fold due process theory in recognizing a constitutional
right to treatment. The first part of this theory rests on the
premise that the Constitution's guarantee of due process of
law requires that ".

.

. any nontrivial governmental abridge-

ment of freedom must be justified in terms of some 'permissible
governmental goal.' "41 It is beyond question that civil commitment is a "massive curtailment of liberty,14 affecting "fundamental rights" 43 such as personal liberty, which is "an interest
of transcending value," ' 4 the right to travel, 45 and the right of

free association." Thus, it becomes necessary to identify the
"permissible governmental goal" which justifies civil commitment. Although the justification for commitment is often found
in the state's police power, here exercised to protect society by
confining the mentally impaired person who is deemed to be
dangerous,4" commitment is also frequently justified by the
state's role as parens patriae,the goal of which is to provide
282; Comment, 86 HARv. L. REv., supra, at 1293-96; Note, 53 VA. L. Rnv., supra, at
1145-46.
For a presentation and discussion of the cruel and unusual punishment theory see
Brief for Amici Curiae, supra, at 55-60; LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED,
supra note 4, at 281; Comment, 86 HAnv. L. REv., supra, at 1291-93; Note, 53 VA. L.
REv., supra, at 1144-45; Note, 77 YALE L.J., supra, at 97-100.
" U.S. CONST. amend. V, providing: "No person shall... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1,
providing: "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law ....
"
"1 Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct.
171 (1974) quoting Tribe, Foreward-Towarda Model of Roles in the Due Process of
Life and Law, 87 HAv. L. REv. 1, 17 (1973).
42 Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
4 Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 113 (1966).
" Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
0 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116 (1958) ("Freedom of movement is basic to our scheme of values." Id. at 126.).
1S Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). For further discussion of the
impact of civil commitment upon "fundamental rights" see Chambers, Alternatives
to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill-Practical Guides and Constitutional
Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107 (1972).
41 An enumeration of the police power purposes of involuntary commitment would
include at least the following: protection of society and its citizens from (1) physical
harm, (2) mental and emotional harm, (3) financial harm, and (4) nuisances caused
by mentally ill persons. LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTAlLY HANDICAPPED, supranote 4, at
105.
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treatment and care for the mentally impaired person." It is
with regard to the latter, commitment under the rubric of
parens patriae, that this first theory of a due process right to
treatment has application.4 9
The basis for that application is the principle, recently
established by the Supreme Court, that "[a]t the least, due
process requires that the nature and duration of commitment
bear some reasonable relation to the purposes for which the
individual is committed."5 If a person is committed under the
parens patriae rationale, then the purpose of his commitment
is treatment and ". .. the due process clause requires that
minimally adequate treatment be provided" 5 1 Such treatment
" See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d
507 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 171 (1974). See also AMEmcAN BAR FouNDATioN,
supra note 4, at 36-49; Chambers, supra note 46, at 1119-21; Katz, The Right to
Treatment-An EnchantingLegal Fiction, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 755 (1969); Note, 53 VA.
L. Rv., supra note 39; Note, 77 YALE L.J., supra note 39.
An enumeration of the parenspatriaepurposes of involuntary commitment would
include at least the following: (1) protection of the mentally ill person from selfinflicted physical, mental, and financial harm; (2) treatment of the person committed;
(3) "custodial care of the mentally ill who are not treatable under the current 'state of
the art'." LEGAL MGhTS or TH MENTALLY HANnicAPPED, supra note 4, at 105.
"1 The due process issues posed by civil commitment under the police power
rationale, which is merely a euphemism for preventive detention, are beyond the scope
of this comment. However, as one writer has stated: ". . . if the state is to confine
someone because he is dangerous, with no promise of treatment, it must do so under
statutes with clearly defined standards and with procedures approaching those of the
Note, 77 YALE L.J., supra note 39, at 102-03. See also
criminal process in rigor. . . ...
Note, 79 HARv. L. Rav., supra note 4.
" Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). In this case the confinement of a
deaf-mute retardate found incompetent to stand trial and confined to a mental institution where no suitable treatment was provided and where he remained three and onehalf years was held to be a violation of due process. Writing for a unanimous Court,
Mr. Justice Blackmun stated:
We hold, consequently, that a person charged by a State with a criminal
offense who was committed'solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to
trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to
determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will obtain that
capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case,
then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or
release the defendant. Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment
must be justified by progress toward that goal.
Id.
" Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 521 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct.
171 (1974).
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is required because without treatment there is no "reasonable
relation" between the "nature" and "purposes" of the person's
commitment. In essence, the theory is, as stated in Wyatt, that
"[t]o deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic
reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates
the very fundamentals of due process."5
The second of the due process grounds for a constitutional
right to treatment begins with the proposition that, generally,
due process requires that a person can be deprived of his liberty
only if (1) he has committed a specific act previously described
as a crime, and (2) he has an opportunity, provided by a criminal trial, with all of its attendant procedural protections for the
accused, to contest the allegations against him. 3 When a person is deprived of his liberty without such procedural safeguards, as he is in the civil commitment process, 5 ".

.

. there

must be a quid pro quo extended by the government to justify
confinement.

'5

This quid pro quo is the availability of reason-

ably adequate and effective treatment for the person committed.56 Thus, a person who is involuntarily committed has a
constitutional right to treatment under the due process clause,
because failure to provide such treatment eliminates the quid
pro quo which made his civil commitment constitutionally permissible in the first place.57
325 F. Supp. at 785.
See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 537 (1968) (Black, J., concurring opinion).
" A discussion of the procedural aspects of the civil commitment process is beyond the scope of this comment. For a discussion of the procedural due process requirements of civil commitment see Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis.
1972). See also AmsamcA BAR FOUNDATION, supranote 4; Note, 79 HAv. L. REv., supra
note 4.
-" Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct.
12
3

171 (1974).
" Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct.
171 (1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, on submission of proposed standards

by defendants, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387
(M.D. Ala. 1972), appeal docketed sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, No. 72-2634, 5th Cir.,
Aug. 1, 1972. See also Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971) (mere fact
that a person may be "dangerous" as well as mentally ill does not justify confinement
without treatment).
17Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 171

(1974); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325
F. Supp. 781, on submission of proposed standards by defendants, 334 F. Supp. 1341
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The Wyatt court expressed this theory in less specific, but
nonetheless cogent, terms:
When patients are so committed [involuntarily, through
noncriminal proceedings, and without the constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants] for treatment purposes they unquestionably have a constitutional right to
receive such individual treatment as will give each of them a
realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her
mental condition. Adequate and effective treatment is constitutionally required because, absent treatment, the hospital is
transformed "into a penitentiary where one could be held
indefinitely for no convicted offense." The purpose of involuntary hospitalization for treatment purposes is treatment
and not mere custodial care or punishment. This is the only
justification, from a constitutional standpoint, that allows
civil commitments to mental institutions . . .
B.

Equal Protection

A second constitutional provision which has been asserted
as the basis of a constitutional right to treatment is the equal
protection clause. 9 The equal protection clause requires scrutiny of the standards by which a state makes classifications
among citizens. At a minimum, it demands that "the state's
action. . . be rationally based and free from invidious discrimination."6 Equal protection does not require that all persons be
dealt with identically, but it does require that if a state treats

citizens dissimilarly, the classification created must "bear
some reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose.""1
(M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), appeal docketed
sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, No. 72-2634, 5th Cir., Aug. 1, 1972. But see New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y.
1973), wherein the court noted but criticized this due process theory:
The proposition that the quid pro quo for commitment in lieu of criminal
incarceration must be treatment is not really radical. Expanding that proposition, however, into a constitutional right to habilitation owed by the State
of New York to mentally retarded children resident at Willowbrook is more
than the next logical step in an inexorable sequence.
Id. at 759.
"325 F. Supp. at 784 (citations omitted).
"U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1, providing: "No State shall.. . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1969).
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972).
W
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In addition, if a classification affects "fundamental rights," the
"state action" must be subjected to "close constitutional scrutiny." Such scrutiny places a heavy burden on the state to
justify its classification and requires that the classification be
"necessary to promote a compelling state interest." 3 "Since
the classification of [a person] as mentally impaired and
civilly committable drastically impinges on fundamental rights
,"64

this classification must be scrutinized under the

"compelling state interest" test, as well as the "rational relation" test.
In applying the "rational relation" standard of equal
protection to involuntary civil commitment, it is necessary to
determine whether the classification of a person as mentally
impaired and in need of commitment bears a reasonable relationship to any legitimate state purpose. As discussed in the
preceding section,65 the justification for involuntary civil commitment is found in the state's police power, which allows commitment for the protection of society, or the state's role as
parens patriae, which allows commitment for treatment purposes, or a combination of both. However, the legitimacy of
commitment based on dangerousness to society-preventive
detention-is open to serious question in view of the lack of
empirical data correlating mental impairment with future dangerous conduct. 6 Furthermore, while the parenspatriaerationale for commitment does articulate a legitimate state purpose,
the action of classifying a person as mentally impaired and in
need of commitment for treatment is reasonable only if such
treatment is in fact provided. Thus, it has been asserted that
under the "rational relation" test of equal protection, a person
6!

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972).

Id. at 337.
64 Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 39, at 62. For discussion of the effect of
commitment upon fundamental rights, see text accompanying and authorities cited
notes 42-46 supra. See also Comment, 86 HARv. L. REV., supra note 39, at 1293-96
(wherein it is asserted that classification based on mental impairment may constitute
a "suspect classification").
See text accompanying and authorities cited notes 47-48 supra.
66 See H. BRIL & B. MALZBERG, MNrAL HosPrAL SERICE (APA) Supp. No. 153
(1962); J. RAPPEPORT, THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF THE DANGEROUSNESS OF THE
MENTALLY ILL (1967); Comment, 86 HARV. L. REV., supra note 39, at 1289-90 nn. 4344, 1293-94.
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involuntarily civilly committed has a right to treatment.67
When the foregoing analysis of the justification and purposes of involuntary civil commitment is subjected to scrutiny
under the "compelling state interest" test, the argument that
such commitment unaccompanied by treatment violates equal
protection is even more persuasive. Applying this demanding
equal protection standard to the police power rationale, the use
of involuntary commitment for preventive detention is, at least
arguably, constitutionally deficient. The absence of data connecting mental impairment with dangerousness may not only
preclude this rationale for commitment from being considered
a compelling state interest, but, in addition, it may render
preventive detention an unnecessary exercise of the police
power. 8 The parens patriae justification for commitment, on
the other hand, seems to represent a compelling state interest.
But classification of a person as civilly committable under this
rationale cannot be viewed as necessaryto promote the interest
of providing treatment unless commitment is in fact accompanied by treatment. Thus, it can be asserted that "[m]ental
impairment is a constitutionally permissible basis for a classification which affects fundamental rights only if the state provides persons in this class with suitable treatment to alleviate
to function more effectheir mental condition and permit them
9
tively and return to the community."
C.

Cruel and UnusualPunishment

The Constitution's ban on the imposition of "cruel and
unusual punishment" 0 forms the basis of a third theory in
support of a constitutional right to treatment. In discussing the
meaning of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, Chief
Justice Warren wrote:
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has
0 See Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 39, at 61-67; LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED, supra note 4, at 282; Comment, 86 HARv. L. Rav., supranote 39,
at 1293-96; Note, 53 VA. L. Rav., supra note 39, at 1145-46.
u See Comment, 86 HARv. L. Rzv., supra note 39, at 1289-90 nn. 43-44, 1293-94.
" Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 39, at 63.
", U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII, providing:"... [c]ruel and unusual punishments
[shall not be] inflicted."
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the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that
this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards ... . The Amendment must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society.71
The "primary purpose" of this clause has been".., directed
at the method or kind of punishment imposed for the violation
of criminal statutes. '72 However, " . . . any deprivation of liberty, incarceration, or physical detention is, in reality, a form
of punishment. 7' 3 Thus, the manner in which the civilly committed are confined is also subject to review under the constitutional standards of cruel and unusual punishment. 74
The underlying principle of the cruel and unusual punishment theory of a constitutional right to treatment is derived
from the case of Robinson v. California.75 In this case the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a California statute
making it a misdemeanor, subject to a mandatory jail term of
not less than 90 days, for a person to be addicted to the use of
narcotics. 7 The Court found this statute to be an unconstitutional imposition of a cruel and unusual punishment because
77
it made "the status of narcotics addiction a criminal offense"
even if the addict "has never touched any narcotic drug within
the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior. '78 The basic
principle is that punishment for an illness, a condition beyond
a person's control, is an unconstitutional violation of the cruel
and unusual punishment clause. This principle is made clear
by the distinction drawn in the opinion between such punishment and confinement for "compulsory treatment" which is
constitutionally permissible:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would
attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease.
A State might determine that the general health and welfare
71Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958).
72 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1968) (opinion of Marshall, J.).
73Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1193 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
7' Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972).
75370 U.S. 660 (1962).
76

Id.

" Id. at 666.
78

Id. at 667.
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require that the victims of these and other human afflictions
be dealt'with by compulsory treatment, involving quarantine, confinement, or sequestration. But, in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a criminal
offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally
thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."
The principles enunciated in Robinson are applicable to
the issue of a constitutional right to treatment because "...
absent treatment, the hospital is transformed 'into a penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted
offense.' , That is, it can be argued that confinement resulting from civil commitment is, in the absence of treatment,
merely punishment for the condition or status of mental impairment and that under the principles of Robinson such punishment is proscribed. Therefore, it has been contended that if
confinement pursuant to involuntary civil commitment is to
satisfy the requirements of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause, such confinement must be accompanied by treatment."
I. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT:
THE JusTciAmrrY IssuE
The principal arguments directed against the concept of a
constitutionally based right to treatment do not directly challenge the theories in support of such a right outlined in the
preceding section.2 Instead, opponents of the constitutional
right to treatment primarily have focused on the justiciability
of the right to treatment issue. 3 The two most important as,"Id. at 666.
The reference in this quote to the eighth and fourteenth amendments is significant
because in addition to the aspects of this case discussed in the text, Robinson held,
for the first time, that the eighth amendment is applicable to the states by incorporation into the fourteenth amendment.
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784"(M.D. Ala. 1971).
" See Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 39, at 55-60; LEGAL RiGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HmAICAppD, supra note 4, at 281; Comment, 86 HAIv. L. Rav., supra note 39,
at 1291-93; Note, 53 VA. L. REv., supra note 39, at 1144-45; Note, 77 YALE L.J., supra
note 39, at 97-100.
u It should be noted, however, that in New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), the court confronted and
rejected the due process theory advanced in support of the asserted right to treatment.
See note 54 supra.
0 See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 525 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S.
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pects of this criticism appear to be (1) the asserted lack of
"specific, judicially ascertainable and manageable standards," 4 and (2) the asserted impropriety of the courts, particularly the federal courts, acting to enforce this right.,
A.

Formulationof Standards

It has been noted previously that Burnham v. Department
of Public Health8 represents the leading case rejecting the concept of a constitutional right to treatment. One reason given for
the decision in that case was that the claimed right to treatment presented a nonjusticiable controversy. The court stated
the test of justiciability as whether "the duty asserted can be
judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and
whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially
molded. ' 87 Finding the meaning of "treatment" to be
ambiguous, and consensus within the medical profession as to
the proper manner of treatment to be lacking, 8 the court concluded that "the claimed 'duty' (i.e. to 'adequately' or 'constitutionally treat') defies judicial identity and therefore prohib89
its its breach from being judicially defined. 1
The problems of implementing the right to treatment and
of setting appropriate standards for minimally adequate treatment have occasioned a voluminous amount of commentary.
Ct. 171 (1974); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357
F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp.
1335, 1341-43 (N.D. Ga. 1972). See also LEGAL RIGHTs OF THE MENTALLY HANDmICAPPED,
supra note 4, at 283-88.

" Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1341 (N.D. Ga.
1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-3110, 5th Cir., Oct. 4, 1972.
" See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp.
1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-3110, 5th Cir., Oct. 4, 1972.
86 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-3110, 5th Cir., Oct.
4, 1972.
" 349 F. Supp. at 1341, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
In Burnham, Judge Smith cited Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366
(1956) and Szasz, The Right to Psychiatric Treatment: Rhetoric and Reality, 57 GEo.
L.J. 740 (1969) in support of these findings.
" 349 F. Supp. at 1342.
90 See LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDIcAPPED, supra note 4, at 283-88; Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 742 (1969); Bazelon,
Forwardto Symposium: The Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 676 (1969); Birnbaum,
Some Remarks on 'The Right to Treatment', 23 ALA. L. REv. 623 (1971); Birnbaum,
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Therefore, a detailed exposition of these problems and proposed solutions to them is not necessary here. However, the
response to this issue by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in Donaldson v. O'Connor,9" is noteworthy because it
indicates that, although there may be problems in defining and
implementing the right to treatment, these problems will not
preclude recognition and enforcement of the right.
In Donaldson the court first expressed its hesitation to
reject the right to treatment merely on the basis of the difficulty involved in defining "adequate treatment." It stated:
"[W]e doubt whether, even if we were to concede that courts
are incapable of formulating standards of adequate treatment
in the abstract, we could or should for that reason alone hold
that no right to treatment can be recognized or enforced." 2 The
The Right to Treatment-Some Comments on Implementation, 10 DUQUESNE L. REv.

579 (1972); Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEO. L.J. 752 (1969); Drake,
Enforcing the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 10 Ama. CRim. L. REV. 587
(1972); Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction, 36 U. Cm. L.
REv. 755 (1969); Szasz, The Right to Treatment: Rhetoric and Reality, 57 GEo. L.J.
740 (1969); Comment, 86 HARV. L. Rav., supranote 39, at 1297-1300; Note, 53 VA. L.
Ray., supra note 39, at 1154; Note, 77 YALE L.J., supra note 39, at 104-14.
From all of this commentary, the words of Chief Judge Bazelon emerge as the
clearest statement of the role of the judiciary in setting standards with regard to the
right to treatment.
[The judge must decide only whether the patient is receiving carefully
chosen therapy which respectable professional opinion regards as within the
range of appropriate treatment alternatives, not whether the patient is receiving the best of all possible treatment in the best of all possible mental
hospitals.
The concept of treatment must function at two levels. The first might
be termed, prosaically, treatifent in general: the degree to which a mental
hospital possesses the staff and resources to provide help to all its patients ....
An adumbration of such general standards for treatment is valuable. A
hospital obviously cannot provide adequate treatment for a given patient if
it provides no treatment for any patient. But the mere fact that a hospital
can provide some treatment for all patients should not . . .satisfy the
requirement of adequate treatment for the individual patient. The most
important facet of the right to treatment is not that the hospital does something for everyone, but that it does the right thing for the right patient.
Because individual patients, particularly mental patients, vary so much in
their needs, considerable attention must be paid to the patient as an individual.
Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. Ray. 742, 745-46 (1969).
" 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 171 (1974).
, 493 F.2d at 525-26.
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opinion went on to note that in many cases, including the one
at hand, ". . . it will be possible to make determination
whether a given individual has been denied his right to treatment without formulating in the abstract what constitutes
'adequate' treatment."93
The court then attacked the basic nonjusticiability premise itself, refusing to ". . . concede that determining what constitutes adequate treatment is beyond the competence of the
judiciary."94 Citing the ". . . many cases where courts have
undertaken to determine whether treatment in an individual
case is adequate or have ordered that determination to be made
by a trial court,"95 the court pointed to "the experience of the
Wyatt case"9 as proof that the courts are capable of establishing and enforcing minimum standards for the operation of
mental institutions and the treatment programs of patients. In
Wyatt the parties agreed upon and submitted to the court such
minimal standards. These stipulated standards, in turn, were
supported and supplemented by testimony from expert witnesses.97 The Donaldson court concluded that this procedure
not only revealed ". . . a striking degree of consensus among
the experts . . . as to the minimum standards for adequate
treatment"9 8 but also demonstrated the capability of the judiciary to develop appropriate standards with which to enforce the
right to treatment. Thus, it seems that, at least in the eyes of
one court, the nonjusticiability challenge to the constitutional
right to treatment has neither theoretical nor practical merit.
,1Id. at 526.
4Id.
Id. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Rouse v. Cameron, 373

"1

F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964), decision on
remand, 295 F. Supp. 389 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd sub noma.
Tippet v. Maryland, 436 F.2d
1153 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted sub nom. Murel v.
Baltimore City Crim. Ct., 407 U.S. 355 (1972); Nason v. Superintendent, 233 N.E.2d
908 (Mass. 1968).
, 493 F.2d at 526.

The standards promulgated by the court in Wyatt are set forth at 344 F. Supp.
373, 379-86 (Appendix A-Minimum Constitutional Standards for Adequate Treatment of the Mentally Ill) and 344 F. Supp. 387, 395-407 (Appendix A-Minimum

Constitutional Standards for Adequate Habilitation of the Mentally Retarded).
,1493 F.2d at 526.
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B. Propriety of JudicialEnforcement of the Right:
Separation of Powers and Federalism
Opponents of the right to treatment have also objected to
recognition of the right by questioning the propriety of judicial
intervention (particularly by federal courts) to enforce the right
to treatment. First, it has been asserted that the real issue is
allocation of financial resources, which is properly a legislative,
not judicial, function2 9 The argument here is that implementation of the right to treatment requires the expenditure of resources (in order to provide the necessary facilities, personnel,
etc.) and that decisions concerning allocation and expenditure
of public resources are uniquely within the province of the legislative branch. Thus, it has been asserted that by recognizing
and enforcing the right to treatment, and thereby necessitating
the expenditure of resources, the courts violate the principle of
separation of powers.' °
Adherents of the right to treatment respond to this argument by asserting that allocation of resources is not the issue.
Instead, they argue, the issue is the recognition and enforcement of a constitutional right-the right to treatment.101 Furthermore, there are numerous decisions in which the implementation of a constitutional right has required a reallocation
of resources" 2 because "[i]nadequate resources can never be
an adequate juwtification for the state's depriving any person
" See Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1338-42 (N.D.
Ga. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-3110, 5th Cir., Oct. 4, 1972; Brief for Appellant
Governor Wallace at 34, Wyatt v. Aderholt, No. 72-2634, 5th Cir., appeal docketed
Aug. 1, 1972. See also LEGAL IGHTS OF Tm MENrALY HANDICAPPED, supra note 4, at
289; Comment, 86 HARv. L. Ray., supra note 39, at 1296-1306.
'"See note 99 supra.
" See Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 39, at 67-72; LEGAL RiGors OF THE
MENTALLY HANDICAPPED, supra note 4, at 289; Comment, 86 HARV. L. Rav., supranote

39, at 1296-1306.
"I See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (dealing with school
desegregation); Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972) (dealing with the constitutional rights of patients confined in mental hospitals); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.
Supp. 781, on submission of proposed standards by defendants, 334 F. Supp. 1341
(M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), appeal docketed
sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, No. 72-2634, 5th Cir., Aug. 1, 1972; Holt v. Sarver, 309
F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), af'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (dealing with constitutional rights of prison inmates). See also Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 39, at
67-72; LEGAL IaGs OF VIE MENTALLLY HANDICAPPED, supranote 4, at 289; Comment,
86 HARv. L. Rav., supra note 39, at 1296-1306.
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of his constitutional rights.' ' 3
Second, opponents of the right to treatment have invoked
the doctrine of federalism to assert that recognition and enforcement of this right by the federal courts is improper. Based
upon this precept, it is argued that enforcement of the right to
treatment by the federal judiciary not only infringes on the
power of a state to allocate and expend its resources as it may
see fit, but also unduly interferes with the operation of state
agencies and institutions. 4 The rejoinder to this argument,
however, is that again constitutional rights are at issue. The
deference which the federal courts usually accord state legislatures and agencies must therefore give way to judicial intervention in order to safeguard and implement the constitutional
0
right to treatment.

5

IV.

CONCLUSION

Having traced the development and theoretical underpinnings of the constitutional right to treatment, it seems appropriate to conclude by briefly considering the actual effect of
recognition of this right. The most obvious effect is the impact
of this newly recognized right on the substantive law. One commentator who addressed this aspect of the right to treatment
issue has remarked:
In the field of mental hospitalization, the traditional primary
concern of substantive law involves what is basically a two
dimensional inquiry: (1) Is the person mentally ill; and (2) if
10
"o

Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
See Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1338-42

(N.D. Ga. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-3110, 5th Cir., Oct. 4, 1972; Brief for Appellant Alabama Mental Health Bd. at 22, Wyatt v. Aderholt, No. 72-2634, 5th Cir.,
appeal docketed, Aug. 1, 1972; Brief for Appellant Governor Wallace, supra note 99,
at 35-36. See also Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 39, at 67-72; Comment, 86 HARv.
L. REv., supranote 39, at 1296-1306.

1"'Cf. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) ("Federal courts sit not to supervise
prisons but to enforce the constitutional rights of all 'persons,' which includes prisoners." Id. at 321); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Rozecki v.
Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, on submission of proposed standards by defendants, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), appeal docketed sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, No. 72-2634, 5th Cir., Aug. 1, 1972; Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.

Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). See also Brief for Amici Curiae, supra
note 39, at 67-72; Comment, 86 HARv. L. Rzv., supra note 39, at 1296-1306.
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so, should he be hospitalized, or continue to be hospitalized,
either voluntarily or involuntarily, or should he be placed in
extra-hospital facility. . . . The innovative feature brought
on by recognition of the concept of a right to treatment is that
the additional question of adequate care is implanted as an
item of primary concern. '
Even more significant, however, is the possible effect
which recognition of the right to treatment could have on the
conditions under which the civilly committed are confined. It
is apparent that the entire right to treatment controversy has
arisen as a direct result of the deplorable conditions which exist
in all too many mental institutions. One may hope that recognition of a constitutional right to treatment will also prompt
society to accept its moral responsibility to rectify these conditions and provide proper care and suitable treatment for those
who, because of mental afflictions, are civilly committed.
Gary L. Stage
10 Bimbaum, Some Remarks on 'The Right to Treatment', 23 ALA. L. Rv. 623,
625 (1971).

